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IP as Metaphor 
Brian L. Frye* 
INTRODUCTION 
Everybody hates intellectual property trolls. They are 
parasites, who abuse intellectual property by forcing innovators 
to pay an unjust toll. Even worse are intellectual property 
pirates. They are thieves, who steal intellectual property by 
using it without the consent of its owner. By contrast, everybody 
loves innovators. They are farmers, entitled to reap what they 
have sown and enjoy the fruits of their labor. 
But trolls, pirates, and farmers are metaphors. A “troll” 
abuses intellectual property only if its ownership or use of that 
intellectual property is unjustified, a “pirate” steals intellectual 
property only if the ownership of that intellectual property is 
justified, and a “farmer” is entitled to own intellectual property 
rights only to the extent that they are justified. 
In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag observed that illness 
has historically been understood metaphorically as an expression 
of the personality of the patient.1 Specifically, tuberculosis was 
used as a metaphor for refinement and cancer as a metaphor for 
corruption. Tuberculosis was the bohemian disease, associated 
with creativity and expression; cancer was the bourgeois disease, 
associated with timidity and repression. 
Sontag objected to this metaphorical understanding of 
disease, because illness is not a metaphor, but a physiological 
phenomenon. We do not create disease, but are afflicted by it. 
She argued that we cannot understand illness until we abstain 
from thinking about it metaphorically: 
My point is that illness is not a metaphor, and that the most truthful 
way of regarding illness—and the healthiest way of being ill—is one 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D., New York 
University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A., 
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Schmidt, and Paul Salamanca for their helpful comments. 
 1 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 30 (1978). 
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most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking. Yet it is 
hardly possible to take up one’s residence in the kingdom of the ill 
unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been 
landscaped. It is toward an elucidation of those metaphors, and a 
liberation from them, that I dedicate this inquiry.2 
The same is true of intellectual property, because the rhetoric 
of intellectual property is metaphorical.3 In theory, intellectual 
property is justified on welfarist grounds, because it solves 
market failures in innovation and thereby increases the public 
surplus. But in practice, the scope of intellectual property rights 
is unrelated to their ostensible welfarist justification. Intellectual 
property metaphors prevent us from understanding intellectual 
property by obscuring the lack of connection between its 
theoretical justification and its actual scope. 
Notably, illness metaphors and intellectual property 
metaphors even have a parallel structure. Much as tuberculosis 
became a metaphor for expression and cancer became a metaphor 
for repression, innovators have become a metaphor for expression 
and pirates and trolls have become metaphors for repression. 
But intellectual property metaphors are even more 
pernicious than illness metaphors. The problem with illness 
metaphors is that they are false. Illness metaphors propose that 
disease is a product of uncontrolled emotion. But disease is not a 
product of emotion and cannot be cured by controlling our 
emotions. As a result, illness metaphors prevent us from 
understanding disease by obscuring its true physiological causes.  
The problem with intellectual property metaphors is that 
they obscure the welfarist justification for intellectual property 
and encourage the creation of intellectual property rights 
inconsistent with that justification. Illness is a physiological 
phenomenon, but intellectual property is a political phenomenon. 
We do not create illness, but we do create intellectual property. 
As a result, intellectual property metaphors not only obscure the 
justification for intellectual property, but also induce us to grant 
intellectual property rights that are incompatible with that 
justification.  
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to apply 
property heuristics that promote the efficient regulation of 
rivalrous goods to the regulation of non-rivalrous goods. The 
metaphors are compelling because they evoke familiar heuristics, 
but their rhetoric obscures the fact that the justification for 
 
 2 Id. at 3–4. 
 3 See generally Patricia Loughlan, Pirates, Parasites, Reapers, Sowers, Fruits, 
Foxes . . . The Metaphors of Intellectual Property, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 211 (2006). 
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creating property rights in rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods is 
totally different. Property rights that increase social welfare 
when applied to rivalrous property may decrease social welfare 
when applied to non-rivalrous property. Intellectual property 
metaphors induce us to ignore efficiency, by taking property 
rights for granted. 
I. THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Intellectual property provides exclusive rights to use ideas, 
expressions, and marks, among other things. Those exclusive 
rights are in tension with antitrust law and the right to free 
expression protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the 
proper scope of those rights depends on the justification for 
intellectual property. 
A.  The Economic Theory of Intellectual Property 
The prevailing theory of intellectual property is the economic 
theory, which holds that intellectual property is justified because 
it solves market failures caused by free riding and transaction 
costs. Under the economic theory, patents and copyrights solve 
market failures caused by free riding by indirectly subsidizing 
innovation. Other forms of intellectual property, like trademarks 
and trade secrets, also solve market failures caused by 
transaction costs.4 
A market failure exists when the market allocation of a good 
is not economically efficient. Free riding and transaction costs 
cause market failures by preventing the efficient allocation of 
goods. Free riding, or the ability to consume a good without 
paying the marginal cost of production, causes market failures by 
creating an incentive to overuse rival goods and underproduce 
non-rival goods. Transaction costs, or costs incurred incident to a 
market exchange, cause market failures by preventing 
economically efficient exchanges. 
Innovation is vulnerable to free riding because, in the 
absence of intellectual property, it is a non-excludable, non-rival 
good. As a consequence, market participants have an incentive to 
underinvest in innovation and consume the innovations created 
by others, causing market failures. Rational marginal innovators 
will invest in innovation only if they can recover their sunk costs 
and opportunity costs by charging a premium price for their 
goods, but free riding by competitors would quickly reduce the 
market price of the good to marginal cost of production. 
 
 4 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 78 (2013). 
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Intellectual property enables marginal innovators to recover 
their costs by providing an indirect subsidy in the form of a 
limited monopoly to use certain innovations. In other words, 
intellectual property solves market failures in innovation by 
making it partially excludable and thereby reducing free riding.  
Marks and secrets are vulnerable to transaction costs 
because, in the absence of intellectual property, information costs 
and agency costs would increase. Trademarks reduce information 
costs by enabling consumers to identify the source of a product. 
Trade secrets reduce agency costs by making it easier for 
principals to prevent their agents from disclosing innovations. 
Of course, these are only hypotheses. It may or may not be 
the case that without intellectual property free riding and 
transaction costs would cause underinvestment in innovation 
and quality. And it may or may not be the case that intellectual 
property actually provides salient incentives to invest in 
innovation and quality. 
The economic theory is explicitly welfarist, holding that 
intellectual property is justified because it increases social 
welfare.5 “Intellectual property rights, like other property rights, 
are justified where—and only where—the costs of exclusion and 
related costs are outweighed by the benefits attending additional 
creation or discovery and the benefits of better management, 
promotion, and allocation of property.”6 Intellectual property 
increases social welfare by solving market failures caused by free 
riding on innovation, thereby creating an incentive to invest in 
innovation. Trademarks and trade secrets increase social welfare 
by solving market failures caused by transaction costs, thereby 
creating an incentive to invest in quality and innovation. In other 
words, intellectual property is justified because it produces a 
social benefit that exceeds its social cost. 
Under the economic theory, intellectual property is justified 
only to the extent that it is efficient. It follows that an 
intellectual property right is justified only if the marginal social 
cost of granting the right is smaller than the marginal social 
benefit generated by granting the right. It follows that the scope 
of intellectual property rights must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, because an intellectual property right is 
efficient if and only if it causes its recipient to provide a social 
 
 5 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On 
the Evaluation of Legal Policy 15 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus. 
Discussion Paper, Paper No. 277, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=224946. 
 6 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 4, at 48. 
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benefit that is larger than the social cost of the right. In other 
words, the economic theory implies that intellectual property is 
justified only to the extent that each grant of rights provides the 
incentive necessary to cause its recipient to provide a social 
benefit and no more, and only if the social benefit is larger than 
the social cost of the right. 
Of course, in practice, intellectual property rights are not 
and cannot be granted on a case-by-case basis. It is probably 
impossible to determine whether or not any particular 
intellectual property right is efficient, and it would certainly be 
impossible to administer an intellectual property system that 
required such case-by-case determinations. At best, an 
intellectual property system can adopt rules governing 
intellectual property rights that will provide the largest net 
social benefit. 
It is difficult to determine the social benefit created by 
intellectual property, especially to the extent that it creates an 
incentive to invest in innovation. While solving market failures 
caused by transaction costs increases static efficiency, solving 
market failures caused by free riding on innovation increases 
dynamic efficiency, because innovation is associated with 
multiplier effects and often provides an increasing social benefit 
over time. 
As a result, it could be dynamically efficient for an 
intellectual property system to incur large social costs in the 
short term, in exchange for larger social benefits in the long 
term. However, this “trickle-down” version of the economic theory 
does not account for diminishing marginal returns. While the 
economic theory predicts that increasing intellectual property 
rights will increase innovation, it also predicts that the marginal 
value of that innovation will decrease. At some point, the 
marginal social cost of increasing intellectual property rights will 
exceed the marginal social benefit of innovation. 
Some scholars have argued that the existing intellectual 
property system may be justified under the economic theory 
because it appears to provide a net benefit to society. For 
example, Cass and Hylton point to a study showing that 
increases in the perceived strength of a country’s protection of 
intellectual property are associated with increases in that 
country’s rate of economic growth, acknowledging its 
vulnerability to omitted variable bias and failure to show 
Do Not Delete 5/22/2015 7:02 PM 
740 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:3 
causation.7 Other scholars have conducted similar studies and 
arrived at similar conclusions.8 
However, many scholars have argued that the existing 
intellectual property system is not justified under the economic 
theory. Some argue that it is inefficient because the scope of the 
intellectual property rights is broader than necessary to solve the 
market failures caused by free riding and transaction costs.9 
Others argue that the existing intellectual property system is not 
just inefficient, but actually reduces social welfare and should be 
abolished.10 
B.  The Labor and Personality Theories of Intellectual Property 
Of course, there are alternative theories of intellectual 
property. Most notably, the labor theory advanced by Locke holds 
that intellectual property is justified because people have a 
natural right to own the fruits of their labor, and the personality 
theory advanced by Kant and Hegel holds that intellectual 
property is justified because personal autonomy depends on the 
ability to control expressions of personhood.11 
While the labor and personality theories may accurately 
describe popular intuitions about the justification of intellectual 
property, they have serious weaknesses. To begin with, they are 
incompatible with the Intellectual Property Clause, which 
authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”12 The Supreme Court has uniformly held that the 
Intellectual Property Clause adopts a welfarist theory of 
intellectual property. “The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is 
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
 
 7 Id. at 45–46 (citing WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
REPORT 2002–2003, at 603 (Peter K. Cornelius ed., 2003)). 
 8 See, e.g., Albert G. Z. Hu & Ivan P. L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries 3 (Nov. 9, 
2009) (unpublished paper) (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1339730 
(finding that stronger patent laws are associated with increased economic growth). 
 9 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 161–62 (2004). 
 10 See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 243–44 (2008). 
 11 See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW & ECONOMICS 129, 156–63 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest, eds., 2000) 
(outlining the labor and personhood theories, among others); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011) (providing a more detailed account of the 
Lockean and Kantian theories of intellectual property). 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through 
the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’”13  
Moreover, neither the labor nor the personality theory 
provides a basis for determining whether or not intellectual 
property rights are justified. The labor theory justifies granting 
property rights in rivalrous goods, in order to prevent the tragedy 
of the commons, but cannot justify granting property rights in 
non-rivalrous goods. The personality theory justifies granting 
property rights in expressions of personhood in order to promote 
autonomy, but cannot explain when those property rights are 
justified and when they are not.14 Indeed, some scholars have 
adopted the labor or personality theory only because they 
concluded that the existing intellectual property system is not 
justified under the economic theory.15 
II. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 
Surprisingly, the constitutional justification for the 
intellectual property system is explicitly welfarist, but the actual 
scope of intellectual property rights is not determined on 
welfarist grounds. Intellectual property advocates uniformly 
argue that intellectual property rights are justified because they 
promote innovation and reduce transaction costs. Congress 
consistently finds that increasing the scope and duration of 
intellectual property rights is justified because it will promote 
innovation and reduce transaction costs. And the Supreme Court 
inevitably defers to those findings when it evaluates the 
constitutionality of intellectual property rights. For example, 
copyright owners argue that Congress should extend the 
copyright term of existing works in order to promote innovation, 
Congress extends the copyright term of existing works in order to 
promote innovation, and the Supreme Court holds that Congress 
could rationally believe that extending the copyright term of 
existing works will promote innovation.16 
Nowhere along the way does anyone feel obligated to show 
that particular intellectual property rights actually promote 
innovation or reduce transaction costs. On the contrary, it is 
 
 13 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).  
 14 See CASS & HYLTON, supra note 4, at 17–31 (criticizing the natural rights and 
personality theories of intellectual property). But see MERGES, supra note 11 (defending 
the natural rights and personality theories of intellectual property). 
 15 See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 11, at 3–4 (“Try as I might, I simply cannot justify 
our current IP system on the basis of verifiable data showing that people are better off 
with IP law than they would be without it.”) (citing Peter Yu, Anticircumvention and 
Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (2006)). 
 16 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215–17 (2003). 
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taken for granted, and the theory that certain intellectual 
property rights may increase public welfare becomes the truism 
that all intellectual property rights necessarily increase public 
welfare. This rhetorical sleight of hand prevents critical 
assessment of the decision to create or expand particular 
intellectual property rights, and is obscured by the metaphors 
that we use to describe and understand intellectual property 
rights. 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY METAPHORS 
While the prevailing theory of intellectual property is 
welfarist, intellectual property rhetoric is overwhelmingly 
metaphorical.17 Popular discussion of intellectual property 
abounds with metaphors: farmers, pirates, trolls, and so on. And 
those same metaphors are incorporated into scholarly discussion 
of intellectual property. 
For example, intellectual property rhetoric uses agrarian 
metaphors to describe intellectual property owners. They are 
farmers, who expend the “sweat of the brow” in order to “sow the 
seeds” of innovation. As a consequence, they are entitled to “reap 
what they have sown” and “enjoy the fruits of their labor.” The 
influence of the labor theory on these agrarian metaphors is 
obvious. 
By contrast, it uses criminal metaphors to describe 
intellectual property infringers. Some infringers are “thieves,” 
who “steal” intellectual property and use it for their own 
purposes. Others are “pirates,” who “hijack” intellectual property 
on the “high seas” of commerce and distribute it on the black 
market. Still others are “bootleggers,” who fix intellectual 
property in a tangible medium without permission. 
And it uses disease metaphors to describe intellectual 
property abusers. They are “parasites,” who abuse the 
intellectual property system in order to benefit themselves, at the 
expense of innovators. Or they are “trolls,” who abuse intellectual 
property rights by forcing innovators to pay a toll. 
These intellectual property metaphors subtly shape our 
understanding of intellectual property law. As Lakoff and 
Johnson observed, “The essence of metaphor is understanding 
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”18 
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to understand and 
 
 17 Loughlan, supra note 3, at 223–24. 
 18 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) (emphasis 
removed). 
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experience intellectual property metaphorically, rather than in 
relation to its welfarist justification. Agrarian metaphors 
encourage us to believe that intellectual property owners are 
entitled to internalize all of the social surplus generated by 
innovation, even though the economic theory holds that 
intellectual property rights are justified only if they are efficient, 
and that the scope of intellectual property rights should depend 
on marginal incentives. Criminal metaphors encourage us to 
believe that intellectual property infringers are wrong, even if 
their actions increase public welfare, without decreasing anyone’s 
welfare. And disease metaphors encourage us to believe that the 
justification of intellectual property depends on how it is used, 
rather than on whether it increases public welfare. 
In fact, intellectual property metaphors obscure the welfarist 
justification for intellectual property even when they are used to 
explain limitations on the scope of intellectual property. For 
example, in Feist v. Rural, the Supreme Court used the “sweat of 
the brow” and “fruits of intellectual labor” metaphors to explain 
why copyright cannot protect a telephone directory.19 Under the 
“sweat of the brow” doctrine, copyright protected factual 
compilations, in order to ensure that compilers could “enjoy the 
fruits of their labor.” Feist rejected the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine, holding that copyright can only protect the original 
elements of a work of authorship, and that originality requires 
independent creation and creativity. Facts cannot be protected by 
copyright, because they are not independently created, so a 
factual compilation can be protected by copyright only to the 
extent that its selection, coordination, or arrangement of facts is 
independently created and has some creative element. The 
alphabetical arrangement of a telephone directory lacks any 
creative element, so it cannot be protected by copyright. “As a 
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent 
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis 
quantum of creativity. Rural’s white pages, limited to basic 
subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short of 
the mark.”20 
However, while Feist held that copyright cannot protect a 
telephone directory,21 it implied that copyright can protect a 
compilation of facts that incorporates any degree of judgment in 
its selection, ordering, or arrangement, no matter how trivial.22 
Moreover, while Feist held that copyright cannot protect the 
 
 19 See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340, 346, 359–60 (1991) (emphasis removed). 
 20 See id. at 363 (emphasis removed). 
 21 Id. at 340. 
 22 Id. at 358–59. 
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“sweat of the brow” of a compiler of facts, it implicitly assumed 
that copyright can protect the “sweat of the brow” of any other 
kind of author. The originality doctrine adopted by Feist provides 
no basis for denying copyright protection to anything other than 
a compilation of facts. In other words, Feist effectively narrowed 
the scope of copyright protection in one area, only to expand it in 
all others, and considered the welfarist justification for 
intellectual property rights only in order to dismiss it as 
irrelevant to whether copyright can protect facts.23 
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TROLLS 
As noted above, intellectual property rhetoric is replete with 
metaphors. This Article will focus on the relatively novel “troll” 
metaphor, which made its first appearance in the mid-1990s, 
became popular in the 2000s, and has recently begun to enter the 
vernacular. The relative novelty of the “troll” metaphor provides 
an unusual opportunity to observe the emergence and 
dissemination of an intellectual property metaphor, to study its 
effect on intellectual property policy, and to consider how it 
frames our understanding and experience of particular 
intellectual property rights and owners. While each intellectual 
property metaphor has a unique history and rhetorical content, a 
similar analysis of other intellectual property metaphors would 
almost certainly provide similar results.  
A troll is a mythical monster that lives under a bridge and 
charges a toll to use the bridge.24 But what is an “intellectual 
property troll”? 
A.  Patent Trolls 
The “troll” metaphor is used primarily in the context of 
patent law, in reference to “patent trolls.” Apparently, the term 
“patent troll” was coined by patent lawyer Paula Natasha Chavez 
in a 1994 educational video titled The Patent System. In the 
video, Chavez describes owners of broad patents as “patent 
trolls,” because they can use their patents to collect “tolls” from 
other innovators, and depicts a “patent troll” as a scruffy, green 
man under a bridge holding a sign reading “PAY HERE TO 
CROSS.”25 
 
 23 See id. 
 24 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05–130), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu 
ment_transcripts/05-130.pdf. 
 25 See The Original Patent Troll Returns, PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnews 
wire.com/news-releases/the-original-patent-troll-returns-58004897.html (last visited Feb. 
16, 2015); ROBERT FLETCHER, INTELL. PROP. INS. SERVS. CORP., A CONTINUED DISCUSSION 
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But the term “patent troll” was popularized by Peter Detkin 
in 2001. At the time, Detkin was assistant general counsel for 
Intel Corporation, which faced a congeries of patent infringement 
actions filed by an assortment of companies with a shared 
business model of buying and enforcing patents. Detkin referred 
to Intel’s adversaries as “patent trolls” and kept a collection of 
troll dolls on his desk: 
Peter Detkin’s spin sounds surprisingly like something out of the 
Brothers Grimm. In the sleepy village of Santa Clara, there lived a 
very wealthy but very frightened giant named Intel. Intel was plagued 
by a fearsome band of evil trolls—patent trolls, to be exact—who 
wanted a glittering pot of gold in exchange for doing absolutely 
nothing. And they were very powerful because they said they owned 
the patent on some of the magic Intel used to become rich.26 
According to Detkin, “A patent troll is somebody who tries to 
make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and 
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never 
practiced.”27 
Detkin’s use of the “patent troll” metaphor quickly caught 
on. Industry publications started using the term, and legal 
scholars followed suit. The term “patent troll” first appeared in a 
law review article in 2002, first appeared in the text of a law 
review article in 2004, and first appeared in the title of a law 
review article in 2005.28 As of 2015, a Westlaw search for the 
term “patent troll” returned almost 1200 hits. 
Eventually, general interest journalists recognized a story. 
Most notably, WBEZ’s This American Life aired an hour-long 
episode titled “When Patents Attack!” on July 22, 2011, exploring 
the “patent troll” phenomenon.29 And where journalists go, 
politics follows. Businesses affected by patent law have formed 
an assortment of lobbying groups, most notably “United for 
Patent Reform,” a collection of technology companies and 
 
ON PATENT TROLLS (2013), available at http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/A%20 
Continued%20Discussion%20on%20Patent%20Trolls.pdf; Paula Natasha Chavez, The 
Original Patent Troll, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lO 
GoZFzHkhs. 
 26 Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, THE 
RECORDER (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/lwtrolls.pdf. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Gregory F. Sutthiwan, Prosecution Laches as a Defense to Infringement: Just 
in Case There Are Any More Submarines Under Water, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 383, 383 (2002) (citing Sandburg, supra note 26); Derek C. Stettner, Meet the Patent 
Enforcers, 77 WISCONSIN LAW., Apr. 2004, at 18, 21 (quoting Peter Detkin); Elizabeth D. 
Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a Pit to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J. L. 
& TECH. 367 (2005). 
 29 When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamerican 
life.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack. 
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retailers.30 Various states have enacted or are considering 
“anti-patent troll” legislation.31 Congress has also considered 
“anti-patent troll” legislation.32 And President Obama has 
identified “patent trolls” as a problem: 
[O]ne of the biggest problems that we’ve been working on is how do we 
deal with these folks who basically are filing phony patents and are 
costing some of our best innovators tons of money in court; or, if they 
don’t go to court, they end up having to pay them off, even though 
they’re making a bogus claim just because it’s not worth it for you to 
incur all the litigation costs.33 
As of January 2015, the “patent troll” metaphor has begun to 
enter the vernacular, if it hasn’t already arrived. There is a long 
Wikipedia entry for “patent troll.”34 And a Google search for 
“patent troll” returns 887,000 results.35 In any case, almost 
everyone seems to agree that patent trolls are a big problem. For 
example, one study argues that patent trolls cost society about 
$30 billion per year.36 Ironically, in 2000, Detkin co-founded 
Intellectual Ventures, which is widely considered the apotheosis 
of a patent troll.37 
So, what is a patent troll, exactly? It’s hard to say. 
Conventional wisdom defines “patent trolls” as patent owners 
who abuse the patent system in order to force innovators to pay a 
toll, as reflected in President Obama’s comments. In other words, 
“patent trolls” are rent-seekers. But the conventional definition is 
obviously inadequate, as it provides no basis for identifying 
whether a patent claim is legitimate or abusive. Or rather, to put 
it in metaphorical terms, it does not explain how to distinguish 
“farmers” from “trolls.” 
 
 30 UNITED FOR PATENT REFORM, http://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015). 
 31 Joe Mullin, Ten States Pass Anti-patent-troll Laws, with More to Come, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 15, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/fight-against-patent-
trolls-flags-in-the-senate-but-states-push-ahead/. 
 32 U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., Goodlatte and Eshoo Call on the Senate to Pass 
Innovation Act, HOUSE.GOV (July 17, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-
releases?id=1F8AF0DB-E1DD-4A38-AE29-BB3F097746DE. 
 33 Remarks by the President in a Town Hall on Innovation, Los Angeles, CA, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/09/ 
remarks-president-town-hall-innovation-los-angeles-california. 
 34 Patent Troll, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2015). 
 35  As of April 14, 2015. 
 36 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014). 
 37 See INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES FACT SHEET (2014), 
available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/IV_Corporate_Fact_Sheet 
_Sep2014.pdf. 
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Of course, scholars stepped into the gap, albeit with limited 
success. Initially, most commentators defined a “patent troll” as a 
“non-practicing entity,” or an organization that owns a patent, 
but does not produce any products.38 In other words, they 
adopted Detkin’s definition.  
However, as the Supreme Court recognized in eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, Detkin’s definition is too broad, because 
organizations may efficiently specialize in producing and 
licensing innovation, rather than in producing products: “For 
example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or 
self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their 
patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing 
necessary to bring their works to market themselves.”39 
In theory, there is no reason to favor patents owned by 
practicing entities and disfavor patents owned by non-practicing 
entities. In fact, non-practicing entities should increase the 
efficiency of the patent system. If a patent owner has disclosed a 
valuable and patentable innovation, the patent system should be 
neutral as to whether the patent owner practices the patent 
itself, or licenses it to another party that can practice it more 
efficiently. The ability to make that choice may enable some 
entities to specialize in generating discoveries. Indeed, many 
non-practicing entities are organizations that specialize in 
research, like universities.40 
As a consequence, most commentators have redefined 
“patent trolls” as “patent assertion entities,” or non-practicing 
entities, with a business model of buying and asserting patents.41 
Critics of patent assertion entities argue that they abuse the 
patent system by refusing to bargain with practicing entities, 
asserting weak patents, increasing litigation costs, and making 
frivolous claims.42 However, most of these criticisms of patent 
assertion entities are either unsupported by the evidence or 
apply with equal force to practicing entities. 
 
 38 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and 
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577–90 (2009). 
 39 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). 
 40 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (concluding that universities are not patent trolls). 
 41 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (“The most 
visible buyers of patents have been ‘patent-assertion entities,’ which I define as entities 
that use patents primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the development or 
transfer of technology.”). 
 42 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129 (2013). 
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In theory, both non-practicing entities and patent assertion 
entities should increase the efficiency of the patent market by 
providing liquidity. The purpose of the patent system is to solve 
market failures in innovation by providing an incentive to 
marginal innovators. But the patent system cannot provide a 
salient incentive unless patents are valuable. If the patent resale 
market is limited to practicing entities, the resale value of 
patents should decrease, and marginal innovators may be 
deterred from investing in innovation. Non-practicing entities 
and patent assertion entities can provide the liquidity necessary 
to ensure that marginal innovators can obtain the full market 
value of their patents. Indeed, many non-practicing entities and 
patent assertion entities seem to perform exactly that function, 
at least part of the time.43 
The objection that patent assertion entities 
disproportionately assert weak patents is not supported by the 
evidence. There is no evidence that the patents owned and 
asserted by patent assertion entities are weaker than the patents 
asserted by practicing entities. In fact, practicing entities and 
patent assertion entities have similar litigation records and 
appear to assert patents of similar strength.44 Or rather, similar 
weakness. About half of the patents asserted in patent 
infringement actions are found invalid.45 This is particularly 
remarkable given the presumption of validity, which places the 
burden on the defendant to prove that a patent is invalid. 
This should come as no surprise. Patents are valuable to 
both practicing entities and patent assertion entities, to the 
extent that they are enforceable. While both will claim weak 
patents to the extent that they are valuable, both prefer strong 
patents, because they are more valuable, either as a way of 
extracting rents from competitors or from practicing entities. In 
fact, if anything, patent assertion entities should have a stronger 
preference for strong patents than practicing entities, because 
they are more likely to assert their patents. 
The objection that patent assertion entities increase 
litigation costs, even if true, is a red herring. Patent assertion 
entities increase litigation costs because their business is 
litigation, or at least the threat thereof. If the patents they assert 
are valid, they are entitled to litigate. If the patents are invalid, 
 
 43 Id.; David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 428–29 (2014). 
 44 See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 
(2012). 
 45 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 
(2005). 
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the problem is not the litigation, but the fact that the patents 
were granted in the first place. 
In practice, the problem is that many patents are not 
justified and should not have been granted. As several scholars 
have explained, patent examiners have strong incentives to grant 
patent applications, and strong disincentives to deny them. As a 
result, the Patent Office grants many unjustified patents, the 
most absurd of which are the subject of much ridicule.46 But they 
are only the tip of the iceberg. And the fecklessness of the Patent 
Office has been exacerbated by the excessively permissive 
doctrines developed by the Federal Circuit. While the Supreme 
Court has finally begun to push back against the most egregious 
abuses, it has done little to address the problem, and remains 
unfortunately deferential to both the Patent Office and the 
Federal Circuit.47 
Patent assertion entities are merely a symptom of these 
unjustified and inefficient patents. Practicing entities have an 
incentive to enter licensing pools and form cartels with their 
competitors because the bulk of their profits come from selling 
products to the public. By contrast, patent assertion entities are 
indifferent between licensing and litigating their patents. They 
have little incentive to enter licensing pools, because they have 
no intention of practicing their patents. While practicing entities 
collect rents from both the public and their competitors, patent 
assertion entities can only collect rents from practicing entities. 
The hypocrisy of the practicing entities that complain about 
patent trolls is remarkable. They themselves hold and assert 
many more patents of dubious quality than the so-called trolls. 
Moreover, in many industries, large companies use shared patent 
portfolios to form de facto cartels. Patents become a method of 
blocking entry into patent-heavy markets. Members of the cartel 
will license to each other, but not to new entrants. As these 
entities grow larger and larger, many begin to assert their 
patents more aggressively. The result is an avalanche of 
inefficient patent litigation over unjustified patents. 
Some scholars argue that these patent pools are not cartels 
because they reduce transaction costs related to licensing patents 
and thereby enable patent owners to use their patents and 
 
 46 See PATENTLY SILLY, http://www.patentlysilly.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). 
 47 See generally Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN 
BAG 2D 27 (2014). 
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produce goods using their discoveries more efficiently.48 While 
patent pools reduce transaction costs for patent owners, and 
therefore benefit consumers by enabling the use of discoveries 
that might otherwise be blocked, it does not follow that the 
underlying patents are justified. Indeed, to the extent that the 
underlying patents are inefficient, the transactions costs at issue 
could be eliminated just as well, and with more public benefit, by 
eliminating patent protection.  
As many scholars have suggested, if “patent trolls” are a 
problem because they tend to own and assert weak patents that 
should not have issued, then the patents are the problem, not the 
trolls:  
Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a symptom of larger 
problems with the patent system. Treating the symptom will not solve 
the problems. In a very real sense, critics have been missing the forest 
for the trolls. Exposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate 
changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying 
pathologies of the patent system and the abusive conduct they 
enable.49 
Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of the patent troll problem 
tracks the difficulty and expense of obtaining patents in various 
areas. The technology sector, where patents issue broadly and 
costs are relatively low, is rife with patent trolls. The problem is 
even worse with respect to software patents, which are overbroad 
by definition and almost uniformly of trivial value. By contrast, 
in the pharmaceutical sector, where patents issue more narrowly 
and costs are very high, the patent troll problem is much more 
muted.50 
So, if “patent trolls” abuse the patent system, what is the 
nature of that abuse? To the extent that they assert frivolous 
claims, criticism is warranted. But that is less a criticism of their 
use of the patent system than an allegation that they engage in 
fraud. And fraud is the basis for much of the state legislation 
against patent trolls. 
But criticism of “patent trolls” on the ground that they assert 
unjustified patents is unwarranted, or at least misdirected. 
While so-called “patent trolls” may assert unjustified patents, so 
do their accusers. Indeed, the patent system is replete with 
unjustified patents, precisely because the actual scope of patent 
 
 48 Henry Delcamp, Are Patent Pools a Way to Help Patent Owners Enforce Their 
Rights?, 41 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 68, 75 (2015); Steven Carlson, Patent Pools and the 
Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 379 (1999). 
 49 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 42, at 2121.  
 50 Id. at 2172–73.  
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protection is unrelated to its theoretical justification. “Patent 
trolls” are merely patent owners who refuse to bargain with the 
dominant cartel. If they are rent-seekers, so are their targets. 
The “troll” metaphor focuses criticism on certain patent 
owners on the basis of how they use patents. But it discourages 
recognition of the fact that all patent owners are merely 
exercising rights granted to them by the Patent Office and by 
extension by Congress. In other words, patent trolls are 
exercising presumptively valid patents, just like any other patent 
owner. 
In other words, the “troll” metaphor is a rhetorical way of 
deflecting criticism from the patent system as a whole onto 
particular patent owners. So-called patent trolls are just 
exercising presumptively valid patents, granted by the same 
system that grants all other patents. The “troll” metaphor 
discourages criticism of the patent system and discourages us 
from asking whether the patents exercised by trolls are any 
different from the patents exercised by their “victims.” 
More to the point, the “troll” metaphor encourages us to 
internalize and accept as justified industry norms regarding the 
use and abuse of patents, without asking whether those norms 
promote the interests of the public or the industry. 
B.  Copyright Trolls 
While the “troll” metaphor is overwhelmingly used in 
relation to patents, it has gradually been applied to other forms 
of intellectual property as well, especially copyright. The term 
“copyright troll” first appeared in a law review article in 2011.51 
As of April 14, 2015, a Westlaw search for the term “copyright 
troll” returns 118 hits, and a Google search returns about 65,000 
hits. 
Unsurprisingly, a “copyright troll” is generally defined as a 
copyright owner who abuses the copyright system. However, no 
consensus has emerged as to what counts as “abuse.” Some 
scholars have used the term to refer to copyright owners who use 
the threat of infringement litigation to obtain unjust 
settlements.52 Some have used it to refer to copyright owners who 
issue infringement notices without determining whether any 
 
 51 See Nicole Downing, Using Fair Use to Stop a Copyright Troll from Threatening 
Hyperlinkers, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 155, 155 (2011). 
 52 See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 53, 55 (2014) (arguing that copyright trolls “exploit enforcement rights by 
using the threat of statutory damages to extract quick settlements from secondary users, 
regardless of whether the use was legally protected”). 
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infringement has actually occurred. Some have used it to refer to 
copyright owners who use their copyrights to silence speech that 
they disapprove of. And some have used it to refer to copyright 
owners with improper incentives to litigate.53 
It should come as no surprise that scholars have found it 
difficult to define “copyright trolls,” because the scope of 
copyright protection is so much broader and less justified on 
welfarist grounds than the scope of patent protection. Unlike 
patents, which require an application, have a reasonably short 
duration, and—at least theoretically—are only granted if the 
application discloses a bona fide innovation, copyrights issue 
automatically, last practically forever, and protect all works that 
include an original element, no matter how trivial. 
While inventors must apply for a patent, authors 
automatically receive a copyright in every work of authorship 
they create, merely by fixing it in a tangible medium. As a result, 
inventors must anticipate whether an invention will become 
valuable, and invest in a costly and burdensome process in order 
to obtain a patent, which may or may not provide a return on 
investment. By contrast, authors can simply wait and see 
whether anything they create becomes valuable, and extract a 
tax if it does. 
As a consequence, the scope of copyright protection is 
essentially impossible to defend on welfarist grounds. More often 
than not, copyright is irrelevant. Because copyright 
automatically protects the original elements of any work of 
authorship, the overwhelming majority of copyright owners don’t 
even realize that they own a copyright. Obviously, copyright 
cannot provide an incentive to innovate to those who did not 
realize they had created a copyrighted work, or who did not need 
the incentive in order to innovate. 
And the scope of copyright protection is ridiculously 
overbroad. As Justice Breyer has explained, the duration of 
copyright protection is wildly excessive.54 But equally as bad, the 
adaptation right provides copyright owners the right to claim 
returns far in excess of what could possibly be an incentive, and 
it enables them to improperly prevent speech. It requires only 
the barest shred of cynicism to observe that the subject matter 
 
 53 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 723, 730 (2013) (arguing that copyright trolls are copyright owners with 
“incentives to sue for copyright infringement [which] emanate from motivations that 
diverge rather fundamentally from the social reasons for the very existence of the 
copyright system”). 
 54 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 266 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and scope of copyright protection are drawn to maximize the 
opportunities for the copyright owners of already valuable works 
to engage in rent seeking, rather than to maximize the incentive 
to innovate. Indeed, the adaptation right is on its face calculated 
to provide rent-seeking opportunities at the direct expense of 
innovation. 
While the inefficient and unjustified scope of copyright 
protection is mitigated by various exclusions and defenses, 
especially the fair use exception, they are effective only on the 
margins. As many scholars and judges have observed, the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners and the exceptions to 
copyright protection are in direct tension with each other. And 
while there is some consideration of efficiency in determining 
whether or not a particular use of a work is protected by an 
exception, the primary purpose of the exceptions is to protect 
First Amendment values and prevent the most absurd 
implications of the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners. 
Once again, the “troll” metaphor performs the rhetorical 
function. Copyright owners use copyright to enforce their right to 
“enjoy the fruits of their labor.” Copyright trolls abuse copyright 
to collect a toll. But both are just asserting rights granted by the 
Copyright Act. And abuse is a matter of perspective. 
Expanding the exceptions to copyright or targeting the most 
egregious abuses of copyright protection can at best mitigate the 
problem on the margins. Once again, the only way to address the 
problem squarely is to re-evaluate the efficiency of the subject 
matter and scope of copyright protection, and to make efficiency 
an explicit requirement of copyright protection. 
Of course, as in the case of patents, the efficient level of 
copyright protection almost certainly depends on the factors 
surrounding a particular work. Different kinds of works have 
different levels of sunk costs and opportunity costs, and sell into 
very different markets. But restricting the kinds of works that 
can be protected, limiting the scope of the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners, and reducing the duration of copyright 
protection would far more effectively address the problem of 
copyright trolls and increase the efficiency of the copyright 
system. 
C.  Trademark Trolls 
On its face, it would seem that the term “trademark troll” is 
an oxymoron. Indeed, some commentators have argued that 
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“there is no such thing as a ‘trademark troll.’”55 Unlike the other 
forms of intellectual property, which pay lip service at best to the 
public interest, trademark depends on the public interest. 
Trademarks are intended to prevent consumer confusion. In 
theory, a trademark can be claimed and enforced only if a 
trademark owner proves a likelihood of consumer confusion. A 
trademark exists and can be enforced only if the user of the mark 
shows that it has secondary meaning to the public and that 
protecting the mark will thereby benefit the public by preventing 
consumer confusion. This would seem to preclude the inefficiency 
and rent seeking that characterize all of the other forms of 
intellectual property. 
However, some commentators have pointed to “trademark 
bullies” as a form of trademark trolls.56 Large trademark owners 
may use their financial resources and social clout to assert weak 
trademark claims. Likewise, smaller trademark owners may use 
weak marks to extract a settlement from a large trademark 
owner.57 
Trademark trolls are also a symptom of excessive trademark 
protection. Courts are unfortunately sympathetic to trademark 
claims that do not present adequate evidence of consumer 
confusion. Moreover, they have created doctrines like 
disparagement and dilution that are largely inconsistent with the 
consumer protection rationale.58  
That said, the explicit consumer focus of trademark law 
significantly limits the problem of trademark trolls by requiring 
an implicit efficiency analysis. This suggests that a similar focus 
on efficiency could effectively reduce trolls in other areas of 
intellectual property. 
D.  Design Patent Trolls 
Commentators have not yet coined the term “design patent 
troll,” probably because its redundancy renders it pointless. 
 
 55 David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions 
After Ebay, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1064–65 (2009). 
 56 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 628–29 
(2011). 
 57 Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to Address 
Trademark Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503, 510–11 (2013). 
 58 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah 
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999) (“This case requires us to interpret 
and apply the dauntingly elusive concept of trademark ‘dilution’ as now embodied in the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.”); see also Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are 
Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1175, 1175 (2006). 
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Design patents effectively combine elements of patent and 
copyright into an even less defensible amalgam of the two. 
Design patents provide patent-like protection for what are 
effectively plans for sculptural objects intended for use in an 
industrial context. While design patents have existed since the 
first Patent Act, they have recently seen a resurgence in use. 
There is no evidence that design patents provide any public 
benefit, or even motivate any additional investment in 
innovation. Indeed, defenders of design patents tend to ignore the 
public benefit that justifies intellectual property, arguing that 
design patent owners are entitled to protection simply because 
they invested in innovation, whether or not they would have done 
so in the absence of design patent protection. 
Design patents are routinely granted for designs remarkable 
only for their banality and lack of novelty. To make matters 
worse, design patent claims are then enforced with an 
expansiveness far in excess of what they disclose, in a manner 
reminiscent of the derivative works right of copyright. 
The predictable result is a deluge of worthless design patents 
enforced by competitors against each other, with no discernable 
public benefit whatsoever. It is a toxic stew of rent seeking, with 
no apparent justification. 
E.  Publicity Trolls 
Likewise, the term “publicity troll” is redundant. The “right 
of publicity” consists of state common law rights enabling 
individuals who are famous to control the use of their 
personality. To the extent that it prohibits fraud or 
misrepresentation, it is largely unobjectionable, although it is 
unclear that mistakenly believing a celebrity uses or endorses a 
product causes a substantial public harm. But to the extent that 
the right of publicity exceeds fraud, it is simply an endorsement 
of naked rent seeking. In other words, celebrities are trolls by 
definition. 
F.  Trade Secret Trolls 
Trade secrets may be one area in which trolls are unusual, 
not least because Congress and the courts seem to so disfavor 
them. The one area in which trolling is common is the so-called 
hot news doctrine, which is little more than naked rent seeking, 
blessed by the courts. Thankfully, the hot news doctrine is 
heavily disfavored by the courts, and largely unenforced.59 
 
 59 See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 906 (2d 
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In addition, one might question the use of injunctions in the 
case of trade secret protection. If the purpose of trade secret 
protection is to prevent misappropriation, it would seem that the 
burden of enforcement should be borne by the misappropriator, 
rather than the public. Trade secret injunctions effectively force 
the public to subside the trade secret owner, and absolve the 
misappropriator from making good on some of the damages it 
caused. In theory, trade secret protection would be more efficient 
if the misappropriator were obligated to pay liquidated damages 
and injunctions did not issue. 
V. RHETORIC AND METAPHOR 
The “troll” metaphor, like other intellectual property 
metaphors, enables a form of social cathexis. It justifies the scope 
of intellectual property protection by identifying “bad” 
intellectual property owners who “abuse” their intellectual 
property rights and implicitly distinguishing them from “good” 
intellectual property owners, while obscuring the fact that all 
intellectual property owners receive and assert similar rights. 
Most importantly, the “troll” metaphor once again encourages us 
to ignore the lack of connection between the ostensible welfarist 
justification of intellectual property rights and the actual scope of 
the rights granted. 
Scholars have applied similar criticisms to the most 
fundamental concepts in intellectual property. For example, 
many scholars have criticized the “author” metaphor of copyright, 
essentially arguing that it relies on the personality theory of 
intellectual property, rather than the economic theory.60 As a 
consequence, the scope of copyright protection expands beyond its 
welfarist justification. And some scholars have extended that 
criticism to the “inventor” metaphor of patent.61 
Shubha Ghosh has argued that the “quid pro quo” metaphor 
should be abandoned because it “rests on a theory of social 
contract that has little relevance to the economics and 
 
Cir. 2011). But see Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 60 See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 
AM. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The 
Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 457 (1991); see also Mark A. Lemley, 
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law 
and the Construction of the Information Society, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 874 (1996) 
(reviewing James Boyle); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes 
Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1322 (1996). See 
generally Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal 
Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
 61 See generally Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008). 
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administration of patent law.”62 Essentially, Ghosh argues that 
patent law is simply a form of regulation intended to increase 
public welfare, and that the scope of patent protection should 
depend on efficiency, rather than on an exchange metaphor.63 
Similarly, Mark Lemley has argued that “property” is an 
unhelpful metaphor, as intellectual property is more like 
regulation than physical property.64 According to Lemley, the 
scope of intellectual property should be determined on the 
margins, and innovators should only be granted intellectual 
property rights entitling them to consume as much of the positive 
externalities or “spillovers” generated by their innovation, as are 
necessary to provide the marginal incentive to innovate. “We are 
better off with the traditional utilitarian explanation for 
intellectual property, because it at least attempts to strike an 
appropriate balance between control by inventors and creators 
and the baseline norm of competition.”65 
Of course, this is also true of property law in relation to 
physical property. Property law is always a system of regulation. 
The problem is that the metaphor of property relies on heuristics 
derived in relation to physical property, which is rivalrous and 
excludable. As a consequence, it naturalizes rules that tend to be 
efficient in relation to the regulation of goods that are rivalrous 
and excludable. But those same heuristics may suggest less 
efficient rules when the goods in question are non-excludable or 
non-rivalrous. For example, when applied to common pool 
resources, they may help normalize rules that benefit 
incumbents, at the expense of the public. And when applied to 
public goods like innovation, they may help normalize rules that 
benefit producers, at the expense of the public. 
Metaphors are powerful when they mobilize heuristics. 
Intellectual property metaphors resonate with the justification 
for physical property and with heuristics around the enforcement 
of social norms. It feels natural that if you create something, you 
are entitled to consume some of the social surplus you generate, 
and that if you create something profitable based on something 
created by someone else, they ought to be entitled to share in the 
proceeds. Of course, while these heuristics and intuitions produce 
reasonably efficient property rules when applied to rivalrous 
 
 62 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain 
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1369 (2004). 
 63 Id.  
 64 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1036–37 (2005); see also Tom W. Bell, Author’s Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory 
Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 258 (2003). 
 65 Lemley, supra note 64, at 1032. 
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goods, they are poorly calculated to produce efficient rules when 
applied to the non-rivalrous goods protected by intellectual 
property.  
However, intellectual property metaphors provide the best of 
both worlds for rent seekers. They enable rent seekers to rely on 
the ostensible welfarist justification for intellectual property, in 
order to claim that it is efficient in theory, without actually ever 
considering what the efficient scope and term of intellectual 
property actually is. And they enable intellectual property 
owners to draw on moral intuitions intellectual property 
ownership, without being obligated to actually justify the scope 
and duration of intellectual property in moral terms. 
In order to understand intellectual property, we must 
abandon intellectual property metaphors, and evaluate 
intellectual property in welfarist terms. Of course, it is probably 
impossible to abandon metaphor entirely, because it performs 
such a fundamental role in our conceptual systems.66 But we can 
certainly adopt metaphors that emphasize the welfarist 
justification of intellectual property, rather than obscuring it. For 
example, we could use the metaphor of “privilege” rather than 
“property” to describe those rights.67 Or we could use the 
metaphor of “charity” to think of the relationship between 
innovators and the public.68 
CONCLUSION 
While the justification for intellectual property is welfarist, 
intellectual property rhetoric is overwhelmingly metaphorical. 
Intellectual property metaphors encourage us to understand and 
experience intellectual property in terms of physical property. 
And they obscure the welfarist justification for intellectual 
property by encouraging us to draw on heuristics drawn from 
physical property. Those heuristics are inefficient, because 
physical property is rivalrous and intellectual property is not.  
 
 
 
 66 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 210–211. 
 67 See generally TOM BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW, 
AND THE COMMON GOOD (2014). 
 68 Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
